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Purpose: We investigate the joint effect of corporate risk disclosure (CRD) and corporate 
governance (CG) on firm value in Tunisia.  
Design/methodology/approach: We examine a sample of 156 firm-observations of Tunisian 
listed companies during 2008-2013. A manual content analysis method is used to measure the 
level of risk disclosure. 
Findings: We find that CRD a negative and significant effect on firm value. In addition, family 
ownership negatively affects firm value. However, board size, the independence of the audit 
committee, and the presence of the women on the board lead to greater firm value. We find a 
substitution effect between CRD and CG mechanisms on the firm value.  
Originality/value: This paper adds to risk disclosure studies by examining the economic 
consequences of CRD in emerging market. Furthermore, this paper contributes to the literature 
by being the first study, to the best of our knowledge, which investigates the joint effect of CRD 
and CG mechanisms on firm value. 
 
 











The overall business performance of Tunisia witnessed a decline in the recent years that was 
mainly because of the the Arab Spring. Indeed, the growth rate economy sharply decreased 
during 2019 (approximately one percent), contrary to the optimistic expectations at the end of 
2018 (approximately three percent). These circumstances shed the light on implementing the 
necessary measures on the macroeconomic scale as well as the microeconomic one. 
Accordingly, on a microeconomic side, corporate disclosure (CD) practices, particularly 
corporate risk disclosure (CRD), and CG structure are believed to increase firm value. In point 
of fact CRD practice has gained considerable attention in current accounting literature. The 
importance of such practice has been emphasized after enormous collapses around the world, 
and relevant information is more required by the different shareholders in order to assess the 
risk’firm profile (Linsley and Shrives, 2005). Indeed, when the users of financial reports are 
aware about the companies’risks and the way that could be managed, they will be able to make 
an accurate assessment of the firm’s risk profile and performance (Solomon et al, 2000). 
Furthermore, the effective CG mechanisms may enhance CRD. In addition, other trend of 
research showed that CG may has an impact on the firm value.   
Prior studies have investigated the direct link between CG and firm value (e.g. Jaafar and El-
Shawa, 2009; Erkens et al, 2012; Duppati et al, 2019). However, the results still inconclusive 
and differ within the context. Furthermore, although CRD has attracted a number of researchers 
to examine its determinants, research on the consequences of this type of disclosure is still 
limited and particularly scare in developing countries. Limited literature examined the impact 
of CRD on firm performance or firm value (e.g. Elshandidy et al, 2013, Bravo, 2017).  Despite 
these efforts, no study, to the best of our knowledge, examined directly the joint effect of both 
the CRD and CG on firm value. The present paper aims to examine the effect of CRD and CG 
on the firm value. We use agency theory to develop our research hypotheses. Agency theory 




(shareholders) and agent (management) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Thus, to reduce agency problems and conflict of interest, disclosure and CG were considered 
part of the monitoring process allowing shareholders to assess managers’ accountability, to 
make decisions and better forecasts. Consequently, risk disclosure may alleviate agency 
conflicts and is helpful to shareholders to have the accurate information about the firm risk 
profile and to build a trust relationship with managers (Linsmeier et al, 2002). Accordingly, 
CRD and CG are believed to have an impact on firm value. However, their joint effect on firm 
value should be investigated. Hence, this study seeks to add to the literature on CRD in 
emerging economies, using the Tunsian context, by investigating these potential relationships.  
 We contribute to the literature by examining the consequences of the CRD practices in an 
emerging context. Most of previous studies have examined CRD and firm value in developed 
contexts (e.g. Bravo, 2017) and few of them were interested in emerging context (e.g. Al-
Maghzom et al, 2016). For that, there was call of more investigation on the economic 
consequences of risk information (Khlif and Hussainey, 2016, Haj-Salem et al, 2019). 
Moreover, the joint effect of CRD and CG has been neglected in accounting literature. To the 
best of our knowledge, our study is the first study that fill this gap. 
Consequently, based on a sample of 156 firm-observations of Tunisian listed companies we 
investigate this association. Firstly, we examine the impact of CRD on firm value. Secondly, 
we complement prior research (e.g. Duppati et al, 2019), we examine the impact of CG in firm 
value. Finaly, we test whether there is a complementary or substitutive relation between CRD 
and CG on their impact on firm value.   
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review and the hypotheses 
development. Section 3 discusses the research method. Section 4 discusses the findings. Section 
5 reports our robustness tests. Section 6 concludes.  




2.1. Corporate Risk Disclosure (CRD) and firm value 
Agency theory predicts a delegation of decision-making power on behalf from the principal for 
the benefit of the agent, which is likely to be conflicting, given the difference of interests 
between different parties. The proponents of agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Eisenhardt, 1989) recognize that the agency problem is created due to the separation of 
ownership and control; which leads managers to focus on their self-interests, in contrast 
shareholders will be concerned by their own wealth. Further to the misalignment of interest, the 
agency problem appears when the principal lacks relevant information to accurately assess the 
the performance of the agent (Ross, 1973; Eisenhardt, 1989). These conflicts are the 
consequence of imperfect observability of the efforts of the agent by the principal. Therefore, 
to mitage information asymmetry and agency costs principals are believed to set up structural 
mechanisms (Eisenhardt, 1989). As a consequence, “to alleviate this loss, firm management 
voluntarily undertakes various actions, including disclosures and submission to monitoring” 
(Xiao et al, 2004, p. 197). Consequently, according to the agency theory the disclosure of 
information is an effective means to manage the interest’ conflicts and alleviate monitoring 
managers by the investors and the creditors. Moreover, especially the agent can disclose 
whenever there is a risk and indicates the good ways to manage this risk. Hence, stakeholders 
will be better informed about the risk that may incur and will be able to assess the current and 
future firm performance. In fact, stakeholders, investors notably, as users of annual reports need 
company risk information before they make financial decisions. Therefore, CRD might 
positivley affect firm value. Furthermore, we rely on the signaling theory developed by Spence 
(1973) which could be used in any labour market characterized by information asymmetry in 
order to analyses people behaviors. Signalling theory predicts that, given the market 
imperfections related to the existence of asymmetric and insufficient information between the 




disclosure of relevant information considered as signals. Indeed, these signals are intended to 
mitigate the information asymmetry. Disclosure used to be considered as a signal which reduces 
information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders (Akerlof, 1970). Many researchers used 
signaling theory to explain disclosure practice in general and CRD in particular (Al-Maghzom 
et al, 2016). Al-Maghzom et al, (2016) claimed that managers tend to signal their firm’s 
performance by dissiminating more information in order to enhance firm reputation, stocks’ 
liquidity of stocks and firm market valuation. In contrast, non-disclosure may lead to 
misinterpretation by stakeholders considering it as withholding the worst possible information 
(Spence, 1973) or the enability to differentiate between good and bad products which may give 
rise to markets meltdown (Strong and Walker, 1987). Therefore, we believe that, according to 
signaling theory, CRD via annual reports provides value relevant information to stakeholders 
for rationale investment decision and this would affect firm value (Merkley, 2014). When a 
company faced difficult circumstances or a disturbing environment, it will be of interest to 
provide risk related information to the market to signal risk-related information and how it can 
manage this risk.   
Previous research disucussed the consequences of corporate disclosure in general. Some studies 
highlighted that voluntary disclosure enhances both the perception of future firm value to 
shareholders and the credibility of financial statements (Athanasakou and Hussainey, 2014). In 
addition, Ntim et al (2013) argued that corporate disclosure reduces the information asymmetry 
and allows the different shareholders to have access to critical resources. It plays an essential 
role for the capital market’ functioning (Healy and Palepu, 2001).   
In the same sense, and more recently, researchers investigated the consequences of CRD. They 
emphasized the importance of CRD to reduce information asymmetries between shareholders 
and managers (Dobler, 2008). Campbell et al (2014) demonstrated that CRD increases the 




incorporated into stock prices. In fact, stakeholders need risk related information for decision-
making. CRD reduces information asymmetry and investors’ uncertainty and consequently 
improve shareholders’ confidence when evaluating companies. However, few are the studies 
examining the consequences of CRD. Moumen et al (2015) found that CRD improves 
investors’ ability to predict future earnings for MENA countries. Furthermore, Bravo (2017) 
found that CRD enhances the investors’ perceptions, which leads in turn to a better firm value. 
Indeed, companies may use CRD to send signal to stakeholders and reflect a good commitment 
with them by introducing the risk management tools to overcome the related risks. In the same 
sense, Elshandidy et al (2013) explained that managers disseminating risk information could 
differentiate themselves from others who did not disseminating this information and hence 
increase stakeholders’ perceptions. When the company is faced to difficult circumstances or a 
disturbing environment it is in its interest to provide CRD to the market as a signal and provide 
a specific information this risk is managed.  
According to agency (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and signalling (Spence, 
1973) theories and the above-mentioned literature (e.g. Elshandidy et al, 2013; Bravo, 2017), 
we set our first hypothesis as following: 
H1 CRD has a positive impact on firm value. 
 
2.2. Corporate governance (CG) and firm performance 
According to agency theory, conflicts of interests can appear if managers and the shareholders, 
whose interests are supposed merged, divert part of the wealth of the firm on the detriment of 
creditors. This difference of interest associated with an information asymmetry gives rise to 
agency problems. For that, CG was considered as an effective tool to mitigate agency problems 




financiers of getting a return on their investment, to prevent agency problems and to maximize 
shareholders’ profits (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Mouselli and Hussainey (2014) argued that 
effective CG mechanisms help to monitor the opportunistic behavior of managers and hence 
reduce the agency problem that result from information asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders. In the same sens, Classens and Yurtoglu (2013) believed that CG mechanisms 
aim to help the firm to achieve its operational targets when there is a separation between 
management and firm’s owenership. 
In addition to its essential monitoring role, CG affects firm value (Wang et al, 2019). The 
consequences of CG have been subject of continous debate in prior research. The governance-
performance relationship has been explained in the literature through agency theory. In fact, 
good CG mechanisms aim to regulate the opportunistic behaviour of managers and therfore to 
reduce the conflicts with shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983) with the primary purpose of 
improving the firm value (Aboud and Diab, 2018). Indeed, better is the CG, higher are the cash 
flows for investors and less are the corporate capital costs (Ammann et al, 2011).  
The literature has reported mixed findings concerning the influence of CG on firm value. On 
one hand, some studies showed a positive impact (Brown and Caylor 2006; Ammann et al, 
2011; Ammann et al, 2013; Siagian et al, 2013). In addition, researchers even showed that this 
relationship differ within the context. In Europe and emerging economies, the well-governed 
firms seem to have a better performance however; the findings are mixed (Bozec and Bozec, 
2012; Core et al, 2008; Enache and Hussainey, 2019). On the other hand, some literature did 
not find a relationship between the two variables (Klein et al, 2005).  
Researchers have examined the impact of a number of CG mechanisms on firm value. These 
include the board of directors characterstics, ownership structure and audit committee (e.g. 




researchers examined the interrelation between firm performance and each CG attribute. For 
instance, prior empirical studies investigated the association between the board characterstics 
(board size, the independence of the directors, CEO duality, etc.) and firm performance. For 
instance, some of them (e.g. Bhagat and Black, 2002; El Mehdi, 2007) found a positive 
association between board size and firm performance explained by the various skills and 
expertise of the directors and their ability to oppose the CEO opportunism (Forbes and Milliken, 
1999). However, others (Cheng, 2008; Liang et al, 2013; Bennouri et al, 2018) found that the 
smaller is the board the higher is the firm performance since this avoids coordination and 
communication problems and enhance the decision making (Jensen, 1993). Furthermore, board 
independence was considered as a monitoring mean on behalf of shareholders and tend to 
enhance firm value (e.g. Jaafar and El-Shawa, 2009; Joh and Jung, 2012; Duppati et al, 2019). 
In contrast, some studies provide a negative (e.g. Klein, 1998; Erkens et al, 2012) or 
insignificant association (e.g. Adams and Mehran, 2012) between board independence and firm 
value. There was also a debate on the association of firm performance and CEO duality. A 
review of prior empirical research shows contradicting findings. For instance, Gill and Mathur 
(2011), Pillai and Al-Malkawi (2018) found a negative relationship that could be explained by 
agency theory which predicts that duality increases self-beneficial actions and mismanagement 
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Other researchers (e.g. Bhagat and Bolton, 2002) found that the 
CEO duality may lead to better firm value. This was mainly explained through stewardship 
theory which predicts that duality of CEO and board chair positions empowers management to 
take autonomous executive actions (Davis et al, 1997). Nevertheless, no association between 
firm performance and CEO duality was found in other studies (e.g. Daily and Dalton, 1997). 
Regarding ownership structure, prior empirical studies investigated the impact of concentration 
ownership, foreign ownership, managerial ownership family ownership on firm value. In this 




due to their powerful monitoring role (Jaafar and El-Shawa, 2009). However, on the other side 
a negative association was shown (e.g. Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) or even a non-significant one 
(e.g. Omran et al, 2008). Moreover, according to agency and institutional theories (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986), institutional shareholders are considered to have 
specific values, regulatory systems and norms allowing them to have a greater pressure on 
managers’ behaviors and the decision-making process and consequently a greater firm value 
(e.g. Erkens et al, 2012; Pillai and Al-Malkawi, 2018). Nevertheless, the empirical findings of 
Mashayekhi and Bazaz (2008) showed a negative association.  
The impact of audit committee characterstics on firm value has been explored in the literature. 
The findings, however, were mixed. On the one hand, several researchers (e.g. Klein, 1998) 
found that the audit committee independence did not have a significant impact on firm value. 
Whilst, Hamdan et al (2013) demonstrated that audit committee independence as well as the 
financial expertise and the size of audit committee increase the firm value. Other line of 
literature use CG indexes (e.g. Core et al, 2006) or a composite CG measure (e.g. Enache et al, 
2019) since different CG attributes may be complements or substitutes for one another 
(Chauhan et al, 2016). For instance, Enache and Hussainey (2019) relied on a principal 
component analysis applied to eight CG mechanisms and, according to the results, they 
consisdered the institutional ownership, the board independence, CEO duality, and board size 
as main variables for CG. The empirical findings revealed that governance mechanisms 
(independent directors) increase current and future firm value. 
Based on prior studies and based on the agency theory as discussed above (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, 1997), we expect that better 
governed firms have better firm value. Therefore, we propose our second hypothesis as follows:  




2.3. The joint effect of CRD and CG and firm value 
Prior literature shows that both disclosure and governance contain value relevant information 
for stock market participants. For example, Wang and Hussainey (2013) found that better 
governed firms have better reporting practices that in turn improve the investors’ ability to 
anticipate future earnings. In the same vein, Beekes et al (2016) showed that well-governed 
companies are more frequently transparent. Moreover, Katmon and Al Farooque (2017) 
demonstrated that both disclosure quality and internal CG mitigate information asymmetry. 
However, internal CG is less effective in reducing earnings managements rather than disclosure 
qualiy. They suggested that it might be more effective in mitigating other forms of agency cost. 
Recently, Alipour et al (2019) examined the moderating role of particularly the board 
independence in the association environmental disclosure quality and firm value. They found 
that independent board has a reinforcing effect on the positive impact of environmental 
disclosure on firm value. Furthermore, Enache and Hussainey (2019) found that US companies 
use disclosure and governance as substitutes mechanisms regarding only firms with products in 
advanced stages of development. They followed Hussainey and Walker (2003) approach which 
investigated whether there is a complementary or substitution effect of disclosure and dividends 
on share price anticipation of earnings. 
Following Enache and Hussainey (2019), we identify four possible scenarios to test the joint 
effect of CRD and CG on firm value. First, we assume that CRD and CG are different ways of 
signalling the same information. This is because agency theory and empirical literature shows 
that both disclosure and governance are positively correlated (Wang and Hussainey, 2013). 
Therefore, we expect that the impact of each variable on firm value will be exactly the same as 
the impact of both variables on firm value. In other words, firms with high level of CRD but 
low CG quality will have roughly the same effect on firm value as firms with both high levels 




H3: The joint effect of CRD and CG on firm value is similar to the impact of each individual 
variable on firm value.  
Secondly, we assume that CRD and CG provide unrelated information as risk disclosure 
literature shows that not all CG mechanisms affect CRD (Elshandidy et al, 2013). Therefore, 
we expect that CRD and CG may provide additive unrelated information and their joint impact 
on firm value will be insignificant. Therefore, we hypothesise that:   
H4: The joint effect of CRD and CG on firm value is additive.  
Thirdly, following Enache and Hussainey (2019), we presume that CRD and CG have a 
‘reinforcing’ impact on firm value. Wang and Hussainey (2013) find that disclosure driven by 
high quality CG contains better value relevance compared with disclosure driven by low quality 
CG. This means that companies will have the strongest firm value when they have both high 
CRD levels and high levels of CG.  Consequently, CRD and CG are strictly complementary.  
Therefore, we hypothesise that:  
H5: The joint effect of CRD and CG on firm value is complementary.  
Finally, based on the recent evidence by Enache and Hussainey (2019), the final scenario is that 
CRD and CG might have a ‘substitution’ effect on firm value. Indeed, when a firm has good 
CG this leads to reduced agency costs and information asymmetry. In this case, that firm might 
avoid the costs of CRD. Because of the expected substitution effect, the joint effect of CRD and 
CG is expected to be negatively related with firm value. Therefore, we hypothesise that:  





3. Methodology  
3.1. Sample and data 
We analysed the CRD in annual reports of Tunisian listed companies for 2008-2013. We 
considered Tunisia a suitable context for our study. In fact, in the period of the study, Tunisia 
witnessed difficult economic and political circumstances that may affect severely the investors’ 
perceptions. We consider that it is important, in such context, to understand the impact of CRD 
and CG on firm value. Furthermore, as many emerging markets, there is a gap in research on 
CRD and there are recently calls of papers to be undertaken in emerging markets (Khlif and 
Hussainey, 2016; Haj-Salem et al, 2019). 
We chose the annual report because it is considered as a very important official means of 
disclosure (Marston, 2008) and as an influential source of information about a firm’s 
performance for investors (Marston and Shrives, 1991). Our sample comprised all non-financial 
companies listed on the Tunisian Stock Exchange. We excluded financial firms because they 
may differ in terms of risk disclosure practices and how they are governed. Our original sample 
represents around 84 per cent of all non-financial companies listed in the Tunisian stock 
exchange in the period of study.  
We apply some filtering rules regarding outliers to ensure the reliability of results. In fact, 
outliers may lead to inflated error rates and cause substantial estimation distortions 
(Zimmerman, 1995, 1998).  Consequently, we remove outliers to avoid the influence of extreme 
observations. Deleting outliers is consistent with prior literature (e.g., Kothari and Zimmerman, 
1995). Indeed, Zimmerman (1995) believes on the power of non parametric tests, the Student t 
test and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, in detecting outliers. He states that “the criterion for 
identifying an outlier itself was based on a “mean” and “standard deviation” calculated from 
data in which the most deviant scores had been altered” (Zimmerman, 1995, p.73). Accordingly, 




any observation representing a t greater than 2 in absolute value following prior studies (e.g. 
Fox, 2016). Our final filtered sample has 156 firm-years observations. Table 1 summarizes the 
composition of our sample by economic sector. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Data collection was performed manually. Most of annual reports were collected from the CMF 
or directly from companies. Moreover, all the CG and firm value data is collected from annual 
reports, companies’ web sites and the Stock Exchange of Tunis (BVMT) web site.  
 
3.2. Dependent variable: firm value 
For our study, we measure the firm value by Tobin’s Q. Through the literature, various 
measures are used to assess the firm value. For instance, some researchers relied on the market‐
to‐book ratio by dividing the market value of outstanding shares by the equity book value 
(Hassan et al, 2009 ; Bravo, 2017); others use as financial accounting performance measures 
the return on assets (ROA) and/or the return on equity (ROE) (Baron et al, 2009). Moreover, 
others combine different proxies for firm value such as ROE and Tobin’s Q (Alqatan et al, 
2019), Tobin’s Q, ROE, and Earnings per share (EPS) (Wang et al, 2019), Market to book value 
ratio, ROA and Tobin’s Q (Siagian et al, 2013).  
Nonetheless, Tobin’s Q is considrerd the most appropriate measure for firm value and it was 
commonly used particularly in the economic, accounting and finance literature (Fooladi et al, 
2013; Utama and Utama, 2014; Wang et al,2019; Alqatan et al, 2019; Enache and Hussainey, 
2019). Fooladi et al (2013) believe that Tobin’s Q is the most suitable to measure the market 
performance rather than ROE and EPS that refect only accounting performance rather than 
long-term firm value. Following prior research (Setia-Atmaja et al, 2009; Enache and 




firm’s total assets. The replacement value is defined as the sum of the firm market value and 
total debts. Consequently, we calculate Tobin’s Q as follows:  
TBQ= (Market Value + Total Debts) / Total Assets 
Following Enache and Hussainey (2019) we use the future Tobin’s Q as proxy for firm value. 
Hence our model is the following: 
Tobin’s Q t + 1 = α0 + β1 CRDt + β2 governancet + β3 CRD*governancet+ β4 Size_ac+ β5 
Size_compt+ β7 Levt + β8 Liquidt+ β9Divdt + ε 
3.2.1. Corporate risk disclosure (CRD) 
We used the content analysis approach to assess the level of CRD in Tunisian annual reports. 
The principle of content analysis as defined by Kothari et al (2009, p. 1649) is that “the many 
words of a text can be classified into many fewer content categories, where each category 
consists of one or many similar words or word phrases, and that each word or phrase occurrence 
can be counted and the counts compared analytically”.  
In order to measure the level of CRD in Tunisian annual reports we used a manual content 
analysis. In fact, despite the advantages of the automated content analysis we believe that the 
manual content analysis is more suitable for our study owing to its advantages.   
Hence, we chose a manual content analysis for a number of reasons. First, we believe that the 
meaning of word within a context are better judged by humans rather then softwares (Deumes, 
2008). This was in line with Abraham and Stevenson (2007) who used a manual method and 
argued that this enables them to extract the suitable themes from annual reports, as any user of 
annual reports will do. However, this approach was criticized  in the literature and particularly 
regarding its subjectivety (Linsley and Shrives, 2006), humans errors (Krippendorff, 2004), and 




higher probability of human error (Nacos et al, 1991; Shevlin, 2004). Hence, to overcome to 
these limitations it was necessary to adopt a validation procedure that consists in having more 
than one person who read and code the written document to increase the confidence that the 
interpretation of written documents show the objective reality (Bowman, 1984).  
However, we have to note that whatever is manual or automated approach, the use of the content 
analysis, requires the researcher to design a coding scheme involving a number of stages, which 
aim to determine the following: the research question, the codable document, the coding unit, 
the disclosure categories and the coding mode. Then, the researcher needs to assess the 
reliability of coding before the results and interpretation (Rajab and Schachler, 2009). 
Hence, according to this we set up the following: 
 The research question  
Is there any information about a risk trough the document? 
 The codable document 
All the content of the annual reports of the sample 
 The coding unit 
The sentence 
 Disclosure categories 
We use an index adopted from Linsley and Shrives (2006) and Moumen et al (2015), and 
adjusted to our Tunisian context by adding items obtained after reading annual reports. The 
final risk disclosure index is composed of 48 items (Appendix A) 
 The coding mode  
In our study, we use an un-weighted approach to measure the level of CRD in Tunisian annual 





The measure of the level of CRD was performed according to decision rules that were adopted 
from Linsley and Shrives (2006, p. 402), Konishi and Mohobbot (2007, p. 283) and Moumen 
et al (2015, p.13) with some modifications. These decision rules aim to give the reader more 
clarification of the content analysis process in order to enhance the reliability and to minimize 
differences of the results. 
Hence, the decision rules for CRD of our study are the following: 
-Any information that explicitly indicates a risk should be retained. Otherwise, the implied risk 
information should be disregarded 
-We code sentences as a risk disclosure if the reader is informed of “any opportunity or prospect, 
or of any hazard, danger, harm, threat or exposure, that has already impacted upon the company 
or may impact upon the company in the future or of the management of any such opportunity, 
prospect, hazard, harm, threat or exposure”.  
-The classification of risk disclosures shall be made by reference to the Appendix A 
-If a sentence has more than one possible classification, the information will be classified into 
the category that is most emphasized within the sentence. 
-Any disclosure that is repeated is considered as a risk disclosure for one time 
 The reliability of the results 
Three types of reliability have been assessed within content analysis: stability, reproducibility 
and accuracy according to Krippendorff (1980).  Firstly, stability “measures the degree to which 
a method of analysis yields identical results when applied to the same data at different points in 
time” Krippendorff (1980, p. 72). Differences in results can be due to human errors related to 
fatigue, personal bias, and perception (Downe‐Wamboldt, 1992). For our study, the stability 
was justisfied since we do not found significant differences by recoding five annual reports 
later. However, stability is considered insufficient to confirm the reliability of the content 




have used one or more independent coders (Abraham and Cox, 2007; Lajili and Zeghal, 2005; 
Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Rajab and Schachler, 2009) responding to the second form of 
reliability which is reproducibility also known as inter-reliability. Reproducibility was used by 
many researchers to test the reliability of their analysis and argued that the index scores could 
be considered reliable if other researchers could replicate the same results (Al-Maghzom et al, 
2016; Haj-Salem et al, 2019). Consequently, two other independent researchers have read 
separately five annual reports by using the risk disclosure index. Following Haj-Salem et al 
(2019) we compared the results by calculating the Scott’s Pi test through the “ReCal” online 
statistical software. The findings show that the average of Scott pi reliability test score for the 
first coder was 0.8604. Regarding the second coder, the Scott’s pi reliability test average score 
was 0.8692. A result of 0.75 is often considered a satisfactory level of inter-rater reliability 
(Hackston and Milne, 1996; Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007). 
Consequently, our risk disclosure measure is considered sufficiently reliable since a Scott piof 
0.75 is often considered a satisfactory level (Abraham and Cox, 2007; Haj-Salem et al, 2019) 
Finally, the accuracy is fulfilled since the risk disclosure level was established following 
Linsley and Shrives (2006) and Moumen et al (2015) with some modifications according to the 
Tunisian context. 
3.2.2. Corporate governance (CG) 
For our study, we considered twelve CG mechanisms. Four mechanisms are related to the 
ownership structure that are the concentration ownership, family ownership, foreign investors, 
managerial ownership, institutional ownership and government ownership. Five are related to 
the board composition that are the independence of the board, CEO Duality, board size, 
presence of women on the board. Also, two mechanisms regarding the audit committee that are 




Enache and Hussainey (2019) to construct a CG index. Hence, an exploratory principal 
component analysis (PCA) was conducted inorder to identify the main corporate governance 
mechanisms. Consequently, the factors with an eigen value greater than the unity were retained. 
Hence, we considered five component (Comp1, Comp2, comp3, comp4 and Comp5) that 
represent almost 68.94% of the total variance in the original data.  
3.2.3. Control variables 
We considered several control variables such as firm size, leverage, liquidity and dividend. 
According to the practitioners of the agency theory, the large-sized companies undergo a higher 
agency costs. Indeed, the more a company is important, the more the potential investors require 
detailed information to make investment decisions (Inchausti, 1997). Consequently, this agency 
cost could be reduced by the disclosure of risk related information. The firm size is measured 
by the natural logarithm of the total assets. 
We included also the leverage as control variable and measured it by the ratio of total liabilities 
divided by total assets of the firm. According to the agency theory, agency costs are raiser in 
highly leveraged firms (Fama and Miller, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Smith and Warner, 
1979). Indeed, the long-term creditors require having more financial information than the 
shareholders (Wallace et al, 1994). To say it differently, to reduce monitoring costs, companies 
with high levels of debt are compelled in addition to be aimed at shareholders to provide more 
information to satisfy the specific needs of long-term creditors. 
Regarding the liquidity, it was measured by the ratio of the current assets divided by the current 
liabilities. In risk disclosure literature, Marshall and Weetman (2007) and Elshandidy et al 
(2013) found that high-liquidity firms provide more risk information to send positive signals to 
investors. In addition, Elzahar and Hussainey (2012, p. 6) state that “according to signaling 




distinguish their skills in managing liquidity risks comparing with other managers in companies 
with lower liquidity ratios”. 
The dividend-yield is measured by the ratio of the most recent full-year dividends divided by 
the current share price. According to signaling theory, firms with high dividend yield are more 
motivated to disclose risk information in order to signal the companies’ threats and their ability 
to manage them. Elshandidy et al (2013) argued that firms with greater risk disclosure might 
be more susceptible to distribute a greater dividend yield to compensate the shareholders for 
these risks. Some prior studies found that the information asymmetry is lower in firms 
characterized by a higher level of dividend (Deshmukh, 2003; Khang and King, 2006; Li and 
Zhao, 2008). In addition, Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2011) revealed that dividends and corporate 
narrative reporting are positively correlated. Moreover, Wang and Hussainey (2013) found a 
positive relationship between forward looking information and dividend yield. In addition, 
Linsley and Shrives (2006), Abraham and Cox (2007) found a positive association between 
aggregated and voluntary risk disclosures and dividend yield. We summarized all our variables 
in the table 2. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics for continuous variables. It shows that the mean value 
of Tobin’s q is 1.68 with a minimum value of 0.43 and maximum value of 4.7494. It also reports 
that the CRD is for a mean of 5.17 reflecting a low level of risk disclosure for Tunisian listed 
companies. Regarding the ownership structure, we note that the firms are highly concentrated 
with a mean of 69.14 %. Futhermore, they are charecterized by a family ownership with a mean 




a minimum value of 0 % and a maximum value of 73.5%, similarly the governmental ownership 
differs significantly among companies with a mean of 14.27 %, minimum value of 24.57% and 
maximum value of 79.81%. 
With regard to the board, it is composed on average with 8 directors. The independent directors 
are absent in some firms and are present in others with a mean of 19.76% and at mot 66.66%. 
The presence of family members in the board varies form a mimum value of 0% and a maximum 
value of 71.42%. This could be related to the ownership structure revealed earlier.  However, 
we note a weak presence of women on boards with a mean of 8.40% and a maximum of 37.5%. 
Regarding CEO duality as presented in table 4, the majority of Tunisian firms (76.28%) are 
characterized by a CEO duality.  
Table 3 shows also that audit committee size has a mean of 3.01 which means that it is 
composed mostly with three numbers and maximally with four members. However, we can 
notice an infraction by a minimum of 0 members. In fact, the listed Tunisian companies have 
the obligation to have an audit committee. In addition, the independence of the audit committee 
members is low with a mean value of 14.70% and a maximum of 33.33%. 
[Insert Tables 3 & 4 here] 
In order to check the multicolinearity problem the correlation matrix and the variance inflation 
factor (VIF) are performed as reported respectively on tables 5 and 6. Discernibly, the 
correlations among variables are averagely low. Furthermore, the VIF test indicates that no 
value is greater than 10, which confirm the non-multicollinearity. 
 [Insert Tables 5 & 6 here] 




The multivariate analysis will follow mainly two steps the principal component analysis (PCA) 
and the panel data in order to test empirically the hypotheses. The first step (PCA) allows us to 
construct the corporate governance measure by reducing the number of governance attributes. 
The second one aims to study the relationship between CRD and firm value, corporate 
governance and firm value, and the joint effect of CRD and CG on the firm value. 
 For this purpose, we focus, first of all, on the PCA analysis across corporate governance 
attributes. The advantage of using this method is is to extract the most important information 
from the data (Larker et al, 2007) and accordingly to reduce the number of CG attributes by 
identifying the main CG mechanisms. This method was used in several studies (e.g. Larcker et 
al, 2007; Enache and Hussainey, 2019) 
Hence, a principal component analysis (table 7) is performed to the following CG mechanisms: 
concentration ownership, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, government 
ownership, family ownership, independence of the board, CEO duality, board size, presence of 
women on the board, presence of family members on the board, independence of the audit 
committee and the audit committee size. We retain five components having an eigenvalue 
greater than the unity and that allow an explanation of almost 68.94% of the total variance in 
the original data.    
[Insert Table 7 here] 
In order to enhance the interpretability of the resulsts an oblique rotation of the retained five 
components is performed as presented in table 8. Consequently, we use the following variables 
as main variables of corporate governance: family ownership (component 1), board size 
(component 2), independent audit committee (component 3), institutional ownership 




[Insert Table 8 here] 
After having performed the PCA to CG attributes, the next step was carried out through a panel 
data analysis. Accordingly, we started by running a specification panel test (the pooling test) 
following Beck (2001) to decide of the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the panel data. We 
found that the Chow test returns an F (31, 109) = 29.11 and a prob>F = 0.000. Hence, we should 
reject the null hypothesis of homogeneity among individuals. This led us to conclude the sample 
heterogeneity, and then to test the existence or not of individual effect. Therefore, on the one 
hand, we run a fixed effects model (Within estimate) and on the other hand, we run the random 
effect (estimation with generalized least squares, GLS). We compare between the two methods 
by the Hausman test to determine the most suitable model. We found that Prob>chi2 = 0.4364, 
consequently we retain the random effects model. Hence, our main empirical findings are based 
on random effect model for the sample period 2008-2013. 
Furthermore, it was crutial to check the homoscedasticity. Indeed, if the heteroscedasticity is 
not corrected the estimated variances and covariances are biased and inconsistent (Kmenta, 
1986). Consequently, this could be done through the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) Test. According 
to the chi2 statistics displayed through this test, the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is 
rejected for the two models, due to the significant chi2 statistic (Prob>chi2 = 0.000). Hence, 
there is a heteroscedasticity problem that has been corrected following the method of White 
(1980) in order to have unbiased results.  
Considering that serial correlation biases the standard errors and causes a less efficiency of the 
results, we checked the autocorrelation between residuals. Many tests for serial correlation have 
been developed, however the Wooldridge (2002) test is considered easier to implement and 
requiring few assumptions. Since it is based on “fewer assumptions, it should be less powerful 




Consequently, the findings of the Wooldridge (2002) test in panel data (Prob > F = 0.0002) 
leads us to reject the null hypothesis and to conclude that the residuals are auto correlated. 
Table 8 reports these findings. The results show a negative and significant association between 
CRD and firm value measured by Tobin’s Q. Hence, the CRD leads to less firm value. Therfore, 
the first hypothesis is rejected since we predicted a positive association. This negative and 
significant association indicate that CRD is not relevant for investors’s perceptions, this may 
be related to the low level of disclosure. Indeed, a negative association between disclosure and 
firm value was explained by Hassan et al (2009) that is due to the corporate culture of Egyptian 
market who is known by secrecy rather than transparency. Hence, a high voluntary disclosure 
level could represent an adverse signal to investors. In this sense, the disclosure could be 
misinterpreted and generate suspects and uncertainty about the future of the company, thus a 
lower firm value. Likewise, the Tunisian market is known by a low level of disclosure, hence 
an unusual disclosure of risk information may be also considered as an adverse signal. Our 
findings are supported by Wang et al (2013) who showed that voluntary disclosure, during 
moment of crisis, increased, while firm value decreased.  Moreover, Fatemi et al (2017) found 
that companies with environmental, social, and governance strengths, its disclosure is 
negatively associated to firm value and that it depends to the nature of their informational 
content. That leads us to conclude that CRD negatively affects firm value.   
Regarding the relationship between CG (Compo1, Compo2, Compo3, Compo4 and Compo5) 
and firm value, the table 9 reports different results. The coefficient of component 1 on Tobin’s 
Q is negative and significant at the level of 5 percent. However, the coefficients of components 
2, 3 and 5 are positive and significant on firm value at 5 and 1 percent. While component 4 did 




As component 1 is represented by family ownership, we conclude that the less is the firm family 
ownership the better is the firm value. These findings are inconsistent with some researchers 
who support that family ownership mitigates the agency problem between managers and 
shareholders, and they found a better performance for family firms in the US than comparable 
to nonfamily ones (Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Nevertheless, our results are on line with 
Holderness and Sheehan (1988) who found a lower performance for family majority-controlled 
firms. This might be explained by agency theory. In fact, agency Problem II appears rather then 
agency problem I when the majority of shares are hold by an individual or a family in the sens 
that they will have an opportunistic behaviour instead of the other shareholders and thus leads 
to poor performance of these firms. In addition, Anderson and Reeb (2003) demonstrated that 
the positive association between family ownership and firm value starts to mitigate off at around 
30 percent ownership.  
The component2 is represented by board size. According to the results, we conclude that board 
size has a positive effect on firm value. The findings are in accordance with Bhagat and Black 
(2002), and El Mehdi (2007), while they are inconsistent with Liang et al (2013), and Bennouri 
et al (2018). The positive association could be explained by the greater efficiency of larger 
board due to the diffrent skills and expertise of the directors to monitor the CEO opportunism. 
Besides, the component3 (independence of the audit committee) has a positive and significant 
impact on the firm value. The findings are in line with Hamdan et al (2013). The positive 
associaiton could be explained from an agency perspective. Indeed, independent members are 
considered crucial to monitor mangement and reduce conflicts of interest (Fama & Jensen 
1983). They are not allied with the management and will act in the best interest of shareholders, 
thus increase firm value. With regard to component5 (the presence of women on the board), the 
findings show a positive and significant effect on firm value. The results are consistent with 




ressources and making the board more efficient which leads to greater firm value. Accordingly, 
we confirm that the presence of women on the board improves firm value due to distinctive 
monitoring role. Moreover, their presence improves the compentence board profile, a diversity 
of backgrounds and life experience (Alvarez and McCaffery, 2000). Those ideas are supported 
by human resource theory, which suggest that board diversity enhance firm value (Cox, 1993). 
The coefficient of the interaction term of both Crd_compo1 and Crd_compo4 are positive and 
non-significant. Nevertheless, the total of CRD, COMPO1 and CRD*COMPO1 (-0.1905086) 
is greater than total CRD and COMPO1 (-0.1955007). In addition, the total of CRD, COMPO4 
and CRD*COMPO4 (0.0682684) is greater than total CRD and COMPO4 (0.0609488). 
Consequently, the findings indicate that the combination of family ownership and risk 
disclosure produces related information that are “reinforcing”. This is the same for the 
institutional ownership. Hence, firm value will be the highest for firms characterized by family 
ownership and high level of risk disclosure. Furthermore, firms with institutional ownership 
and better risk disclosure lead to the highest firm value. 
Besides, the coefficient of the interaction term (Crd_compo2) is negative and significant. 
Furthermore, if we compare the total of CRD, Compo2 and CRD*Compo2 (0.1042995) to the 
total of only CRD and Compo2 (0.1303998) we found that the former is less than the latter. 
Hence, the findings suggest a substitutive effect between the risk disclosure and corporate 
governance on the firm value. For that, the board size may act as a corporate governance 
mechanism by itself without being coupled with high level of risk disclosure. Accordingly, 
when considered together, the risk disclosure and corporate governance have a substitutive 
effect on firm value. That means the risk disclosure with presence of good governance lead to 




However, the coefficient of the interaction term CRD*compo3 and CRD*compo5 is negative 
and non-significant. Furthermore, if we compare the total of CRD, Compo3 and CRD*Compo3 
(0.341214) to the total of only CRD and Compo3 (0.355232) we found that the former is less 
than the latter. Similarly, for the total CRD, COMPO5 and CRD*COMPO5 (0.3443057) is less 
than total CRD and COMPO5 (0.3738286). Hence, there is a substitution effect between the 
audit committee independence and CRD on firm value. In addition, the presence of women on 
the board and risk disclosure have also a substitution effect on firm value. In that case, when 
the audit committee independence is higher, instead of better risk disclosure, this might have 
greater impact on firm value, and the two mechanisms would have a substitutive effect. 
Similarly, we confirm that the marginal benefits of CRD decrease in the presence women on 
the board. Hence, the impact of CG, particularly the audit committee independence and the 
presence of women on the board, and risk disclosure in improving firm value is mitigating in 
the presence of each other. These findings are consistent with Enache and Hussainey (2019) 
who found that there is a substitutive effect of disclosure and CG on the current and future 
performance of biotech companies.  
 [Insert Table 9 here] 
4.3. Robustness check 
In order to confirm the validity of the findings we performed a robustness check. This consists 
to run our model differently by using log transformation for the dependent variable. This 
method was used by researchers to avoid potential cases of non-normal distribution, non-
linearity between dependent and independent variables, heteroscedasticity, etc. (Cooke, 1998).  
The homogeneity panel test indicated heterogeneity among individuals. This led us to run the 
Hausman test which in turn show a a Chi2 greater than five percent (Prob>chi2 = 0.0727), 




model we corrected the heoscedasticity and the autocorrelation, since respectively, the Chi2 
statistics displayed through LM test (Prob > chi2 = 0.000) and the Wooldridge test (Prob > F = 
0.0001) were significant. Accordingly, the comparison of our findings with those after log 
transformation, lets us to note approximatively the same results. Hence, we can confirm the 
robustness and validity of our findings. Table 10 reports the findings of the random effect 
regression and those of the regression after log transformation.  
[Insert Table 10 here] 
5. Conclusion 
CRD has gained considerable attention giving rise to a multitude researches. Whereas more 
recent accounting studies have been devoted to examine the practices of risk disclosure, mainly 
its determinants and few other studies explored its relevance, researchers have to considerate 
some neglegted questions. This paper addresses mainly the question of whether CRD and CG 
have a complementary or substitutive effect on firm value. 
The empirical findings are based on a sample of 156 firm-observations listed on the Tunisian 
Stock Exchange during 2008–2013. A manual content analysis method is performed to measure 
the level of risk disclosure. We generate our estimation from a random effect model whereby 
we control with firm size, leverage, liquidity and dividend. 
Our empirical findings show that CRD has a negative and significant effect on firm value. 
Hence, the CRD leads to lower firm value. We also find that family ownership negatively 
affects firm value. However, board size, the independence of the audit committee, and the 
presence of the women on the board lead to greater firm value. Furthermore, the findings 
suggest a substitutive effect between CRD and CG on the firm value. That means CRD with 




We contribute to risk disclosure literature by studying the impact of this type of disclosure on 
firm value in Tunisian context. In fact, studies examining economic consequences of risk 
disclosure remain scare particularly in emerging markets. Furthermore, this paper contributes 
to the literature by being the first study, to the best of our knowledge, that investigates the joint 
effect of CRD and CG on firm value. 
The findings of our study have several implications both theoretical and practical ones. 
Theoretically, the findings of this research add to risk disclosure literature particularly in 
emerging markets. In addition, in order to assess the level of CRD we adapted an index to the 
Tunisian context. Secondly, it extends the risk disclosure and economic consequence literature 
by analyzing theoretically and empirically this association. Thirdly, it explored the nature of 
the association between CRD and CG on firm value. 
Moreover, this paper offers practical implications. In fact, the examination of CRD in the 
Tunisian listed companies could be helpful to the different stakeholders. Furthermore, due to 
the moderate level of risk disclosure we suggest Tunisian regulation bodies to impose 
regulations about the corporate risk disclosure. Consequently, this may lead the risk disclosure 
to be usefull for stakeholders. Moreover, since we found that CG mechanisms are substitutive 
with CRD it would be interesting to to arbitrate between costs and benefits and substitute one 
for the other. 
Nevertheless, the current study has its own limitations. The major limitation of this study is the 
relatively small sample. However, the small sample is due to the unavailability of the majority 
of annual reports and the data for some variables that were collected manually. In addition, this 
is the major limitation of studies who deals with manual content analysis due to the time and 
efforts consuming. However, our sample represent the most of non-financial listed companies 
in the Tunisian Stock exchange. Moreover, other limitation is inherent to manual content 




validity of our scores we followed Krippendorff (1980) and tested the stability, reproducibility 
and accuracy of the findings of the content analysis.  
Finally, further researches could be conducted to investigate the joint effect of listed companies 
by distinguishing between high- and low-growth firms, since, some disclosure studies 
(Hussainey and Walker, 2009) and particularly some risk disclosure ones (Haj-Salem et al, 
2019) suggest that firms with high growth are more likely to enhance their risk disclosure. 
Moreover, further research could investigate the joint effect of CRD quality (rather than CSR 
quantity) and CG on firm value. 
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Table 2 variables’ description 
Variable 
name 
Variable description Measure 
TBQ Tobin’s Q (Market Value + Total Debts) / Total Assets 
CRD Risk disclosure Risk disclosure index as decriped in Appendix A 
Sectors Number of firms 
Telecommunications 2 
Consumer services 
-General retailers 4 
-Travel and leisure 1 
Health 2 
Consumer goods 
-Automobiles and parts 5 
-Food and Beverage 4 
-Personal and household goods 1 
Industrials 
-Construction and materials 6 




Oil and Gas 1 
TOTAL 32 
Original sample 192 
(-) Missing reports  29 
(-) Outliers 7 
Final sample 156 




Conc The concentration 
ownership 
The proportion of shares owned by major shareholders 
(who hold at least 5% of equity ownership within the 
firm) 
Mo Managerial ownership  The proportion of shares owned by institutional 
investors  
Inst The Institutional investors The proportion of equity held by managers and 
executive directors  
Gov Government ownership  Proportion of shares owned by government agencies  
Famo Family ownership Proportion of common shares held by the founding 
family and their relatives 
Outsdr The board independence The proportion of independent non-executive directors 
relative to the Board size 
Dual The CEO Duality  « 1 » if there is a duality, « 0 » otherwise  
Size_bd The board size The number of directors sitting on the board at the end 
of each year 
Women The presence of women on 
the board 
The proportion of women on the board size 
Famd The presence of family 
members on the board 
The proportion of family members on the board  
Size_ac Audit Committee Size Number of committee members. 
Ind_ac Audit Committee 
Independence  
The proportion of independent Committee members.  
Size_comp Size of the company Natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the year 
Lev Liquidity liquidity ratio = Current assets/current liabilities 
Liquid Leverage Total liabilities/ total assets of the firm 
Divd Dividend-yield The ratio of the most recent full-year dividends divided 




This table presents defenitions of the variables used in this study 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for continuous variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
TBQ 156 1.684436 .8370441 .4385 4.7494 
crd 156 5.179487 3.171419 0 13 
conc 156 .6914654 .1382707 .401 .9678 
mo 156 .1555679 .1913094 0 .735 
inst 156 .1525115 .1543858 0 .5439 
gov 156 .1427827 .2457763 0 .7981 
famo 156 .3418 .316486 0 .8881 
outsdr 156 .2948962 .1976954 0 .6666 
size_bd 156 8.724359 2.090142 5 12 
women 156 .0495308 .0840356 0 .375 
famd 156 .2290949 .2490075 0 .7142 
size_ac 156 3.012821 .5790669 0 4 
ind_ac 156 .0982827 .1470881 0 .3333 
size_comp 156 7.987269 .4806937 7.0494 9.2242 
lev 156 56.1678 34.06071 9.3359 214.9384 
liquid 156 1.995576 1.448277 .324 7.4998 
divd 156 .0256506 .0255928 0 .1286 
This table describes the univariate statistics of the continuous variables used in this study. All 
variables are defined in Table2. 
 




Dual Obs Proportion Std. Err. 
0 156 .2371795 .0341652 
1 156 .7628205 .0341652 
This table describes the univariate statistics of the dummy variable used 











































































































TBQ 1.0000                
crd -0.1968 1.0000                
compo1 -0.2875 0.2412 1.0000               
compo2 0.0540 0.2260 0.0000 1.0000             
compo3 0.2965 -0.0142 -0.0000 0.0000 1.0000             
compo4 0.1801 0.1233 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 1.0000           
compo5 0.2004 0.1841 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 1.0000           
crd_compo1 -0.2621 0.3353 0.8706 0.0289 -0.0820 0.0748 0.1031 1.0000         
crd_compo2 -0.1259 0.2454 0.0314 0.8173 -0.1862 -0.1791 0.0042  0.0699 1.0000        
crd_compo3 0.2576 0.0238 -0.0814 -0.1701 0.8662 0.0968 0.0357  -0.1433 -0.3458 1.0000       
crd_compo4 0.1708 0.0873 0.0701 -0.1545 0.0914 0.8716 0.0895  0.1281 -0.3278 0.2164 1.0000      
crd_compo5 0.1103 0.2273 0.0998 0.0037 0.0348 0.0924 0.8789  0.1838 -0.0213 0.0696 0.1784 1.0000      
size_comp 0.0112 0.1410 0.1397 0.3022 0.1969 -0.0262 0.2286  0.1580 0.2397 0.1108 -0.0373 0.1718 1.0000    
lev 0.0647 0.2272 0.0030 -0.1722 0.4333 0.2915 0.2487  0.1155 -0.3566 0.5137 0.4289 0.3957 0.2458 1.0000   
liquid 0.0540 -0.2028 0.0625 -0.0151 -0.4244 0.1255 -0.2319  -0.0103 0.0480 -0.3823 0.0412 -0.1951 -0.4392 -0.5376  1.0000  
divid -0.0346 -0.1680 -0.0122 0.1685 -0.0222 -0.0104 -0.1057  -0.1210 0.2208 -0.0793 -0.0189 -0.1243 -0.0551 -0.3875  0.3019 1.0000 
This table presents the correlations among the variables. All variables are defined in Table 2. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 % levels of statistical 





Table 6. VIF 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
crd_compo5 6.32 0.158145 
crd_compo4 5.92 0.168942 
compo5 5.88 0.170084 
crd_compo3 5.46 0.183289 
crd_compo1 5.37 0.186161 
compo1 5.31 0.188492 
compo4 5.21 0.192084 
compo3 5.18 0.193008 
crd_compo2 4.41 0.226681 
compo2 3.70 0.270450 
lev 3.61 0.276975 
Liquid 2.16 0.462308 
size_comp 1.59 0.629184 
crd 1.47 0.681642 
divd 1.39 0.721784 
Mean VIF 4.20  
This table examines the Variance Inflation Factor  
 
Table 7. Explained variance by components 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Comp1 2.70551 .6167 0.2255 0.2255 




Comp3 1.25641 .0879442 0.1047 0.5042 
Comp4 1.16847 .115404 0.0974 0.6016 
Comp5 1.05306 .138548 0.0878 0.6894 
Comp6 .914516 .173675 0.0762 0.7656 
Comp7 .74084 .105349 0.0617 0.8273 
Comp8 .635492 .111314 0.0530 0.8803 
Comp9 .524178 .140131 0.0437 0.9239 
Comp10 .384047 .0781223 0.0320 0.9559 
Comp11 .305924 .0831831 0.0255 0.9814 
Comp12 .222741 . 0.0186 1.0000 
This table presents the principal component analysis to the twelve corporate governance 
mechanisms used in this study.  
 
Table 8. Rotated components 
Variable Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 Comp5 Unexplained 
conc 0.4514 0.2842 -0.1470 -0.0415 0.4557 .2771 
mo 0.1619 -0.4490 0.1519 0.0276 0.4436 .3748 
inst -0.1900 -0.0486 -0.0180 0.7472 0.1674 .205 
gov -0.2102 0.3294 0.1860 -0.3759 0.1295 .2674 
famo 0.5616 -0.0541 -0.0702 -0.0162 -0.0083 .1863 
outsdr 0.1015 0.4849 0.1574 -0.0959 -0.0100 .3961 
size_bd -0.0618 0.5580 -0.1873 0.2145 0.0787 .2924 
dual -0.1502 -0.0073 0.5196 -0.0702 0.1291 .4966 
women -0.1556 0.0146 0.0259 0.0534 0.7132 .2768 




size_ac 0.1051 0.2407 0.2380 0.4716 -0.1055 .4534 
ind_ac 0.1376 -0.0258 0.7237 0.1410 -0.0932 .2289 
This table presents the oblique rotation of the retained components having an eigen value>1 
 
Table 9. Results 
TBQ Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. 
crd -.035295 .0199379 -1.77 0.077* -.0743725 
compo1 -.1602057 .0731038 -2.19 0.028** -.3034865 
compo2 .1656948 .0694573 2.39 0.017** .0295609 
compo3 .390527 .1060128 3.68 0.000*** .1827457 
compo4 .0962438 .110194 0.87 0.382 -.1197325 
compo5 .4091236 .1233539 3.32 0.001*** .1673543 
crd_compo1 .0049921 .0115941 0.43 0.667 -.0177319 
crd_compo2 -.0261003 .0129834 -2.01 0.044** -.0515474 
crd_compo3 -.014018 .0170095 -0.82 0.410 -.0473559 
crd_compo4 .0073196 .0173462 0.42 0.673 -.0266784 
crd_compo5 -.0295229 .0195096 -1.51 0.130 -.067761 
size_comp .0514553 .136916 0.38 0.707 -.2168951 
lev -.0031793 .0029123 -1.09 0.275 -.0088873 
liquid .1619466 .0530144 3.05 0.002** .0580403 
divd -4.856693 2.40099 -2.02 0.043** -9.562546 
_cons 1.470658 1.134769 1.30 0.195 -.7534476 
This table presents the multivariate statistics of Panel GLS regression random effect after 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation correction. All variables are defined in Table 2. ***, 
**, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 % levels of statistical significance 
for two-tailed tests. 
 




TBQ/ln(TBQ) Results Robustness Check (Log 
transformation for the 
dependent variable) 
crd -0.0353 -0.0194    
 (0.077) (0.087)    
compo1 -0.160* -0.0986*   
 (0.028) (0.017)    
compo2 0.166* 0.114**  
 (0.017) (0.004)    
compo3 0.391*** 0.172**  
 (0.000) (0.004)    
compo4 0.0962 0.0545    
 (0.382) (0.383)    
compo5 0.409*** 0.160**   
 (0.001) (0.022)    
crd_compo1 0.00499 -0.000282    
 (0.667) (0.966)    
crd_compo 2 -0.0261** -0.0199**  
 (0.044) (0.007)    
crd_compo 3 -0.0140 -0.00745    
 (0.410) (0.440)    
crd_compo 4 0.00732 0.00554    
 (0.673) (0.573)    
crd_compo 5 -0.0295 -0.00342    
 (0.130) (0.757)    
size_comp 0.0515 0.0837    
 (0.707) (0.281)    
lev -0.00318 -0.00194    
 (0.275) (0.241)    
liquid 0.162** 0.0793**  
 (0.002) (0.008)    
divd -4.857** -3.053**   




_cons 1.471 -0.112    
 (0.195) (0.861)    
N 156 156    
This table compare the findings of this study with a Panel GLS regression random effect after 
Log transformation. All variables are defined in Table 2. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at 1, 5, and 10 % levels of statistical significance for two-tailed tests 
 
Appendix A:  Risk disclosure level Index 
 Adopted from Linsley and Shrives (2006) and Moumen, Ben Othman and Hussainey 





Efficiency And Performance 
Sourcing 
Stock Obsolescence And Shrinkage 
Product And Service Failure 
Environmental 
Health And Safety 
Brand Name Erosion 
Out of stock* 
Quality of products* 
Suppliers* 
Employees* 












































Working Capital Fun* 
Downside risk* 
*: Items added after reading annual reports 
 
 
